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Scientific Representation is the latest stage in Bas Van Fraassen’s sustained and profound 
defence of empiricism against scientific realism over the years. It is a long and 
demanding book. It aims to give an account of how science represents reality, and is 
comprised of four parts, discussing the nature of representation, measurement, structure 
and perspective, and the relation of appearance to reality. The book’s key message could 
be lost in the otherwise engaging and interesting details (many of which relate to 
quantum mechanics but there is unfortunately not enough space to discuss them here). It 
may be summarised as follows: ‘constructive empiricism’ – the antirealist view first 
defended in the celebrated The Scientific Image (1980) – needs to be modified in some 
substantial ways to make room for an appropriate notion of representation. The 
modification yields ‘empiricist structuralism’ or, as I shall call it, ‘structural empiricism’.  
 
The shift is meant to preserve the central epistemic commitments of the old view while 
bringing in some new advantages. Van Fraassen provides reasons for the change; and he 
offers arguments for the new position. But like any shift this is a gamble. If the reasons 
for change are convincing but the arguments for the alternative are not, we end up in no 
man’s land. Or in someone else’s land. I think we end up in the land of pragmatism. 
 
A good way to express the reasons for change is by reference to an old paper of mine 
discussed critically in what appear to be two key passages of the book (Van Fraassen 
2008: 25-26 and 247-250). Since I don’t think my views are described or identified 
correctly, perhaps some extensive discussion and self-quotation will be forgiven in the 
first part of the review. The second part critically reviews the arguments for structural 
empiricism. In the third and final part a more positive assessment is provided which 
hopefully will make it clear that I think Scientific Representation is nonetheless a very 




1. Moving away from ‘constructive empiricism’ 
 
There is a standard line on constructive empiricism that we all have been taught and go 
on to teach our students. It takes as central a commitment to the aim of science, 
encapsulated in the famous slogan: Science aims to give us theories which are 
empirically adequate, and acceptance of a theory involves as belief only that it is 
empirically adequate. The definition of empirical adequacy then enables us to extract out 
of the slogan the nuanced and rich position that is constructive empiricism. As is well 
known Van Fraassen takes the empirical adequacy of a theory to crucially turn on a 
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distinction between observable and unobservable domains of the world. The theory is 
true if it literally describes the world accurately; and it is empirically adequate if it 
describes the observable part of the world accurately. Hence a false theory may be 
empirically adequate; and the commitments of realism and constructive empiricism come 
apart.  
 
Of course we must remind ourselves all along that the language of ‘truth’, ‘description’, 
and ‘says’ is, taken literally, fundamentally inappropriate. It is a façon de parler, 
inherited from a syntactic, or language based, view of theories. On the appropriate 
semantic conception, a theory is rather a set of mathematical structures: “To present a 
theory is to specify a family of structures, its models; and secondly, to specify certain 
parts of those models (the empirical substructures) as candidates for the direct 
representation of observable phenomena.” (Van Fraassen 1980: 64). We may then say 
that the theory is true if it is isomorphic to the world, and empirically adequate if some of 
its substructures are isomorphic to the observable part of the world. Truth and empirical 
adequacy are then structural surrogates of the linguistic ‘truth’ and ‘empirical adequacy’.  
 
So, what is the problem then? It turns out that this conception of a theory’s truth and 
empirical adequacy is in tension with a proper account of scientific representation. The 
not-so-often-quoted sentence right after the passage above reads as follows: “The 
structures which can be described in experimental and measurement reports we call 
appearances; the theory is empirically adequate if it has some model such that all 
appearances are isomorphic to empirical substructures of that model”. This sentence 
leaves little doubt that the empirical adequacy of a theory is to be understood as the 
isomorphism of the phenomenological and the empirical substructures of the theory. In 
conjunction with the previous quote it seems to render the view that scientific 
representation is isomorphism; and that constructive empiricism stipulates that the 
acceptance of a theory implies the belief that the theory structurally embeds, i.e. 
represents, the observable phenomena. 
 
It is not surprising then to find Van Fraassen’s commentators and critics over the years 
assuming that his version of the semantic conception requires an isomorphism conception 
of scientific representation. Among the commentators I include my own (Suárez 1999), 
which might have unfortunately started the trend. At least it led Steven French (French 
2003) to respond by arguing for isomorphism as a necessary and sufficient condition on 
representation in general. Scientific Representation makes it clear however that this is not 
Van Fraassen’s considered view. Rather he agrees that representation is not definable by 
means of any necessary or sufficient conditions: it is not the sort of notion that stands in 
need of any theory. Instead representation is linked to use; the hauptsatz is: “there is no 
representation except in the sense that some things are used, made, or taken, to represent 
some things as thus or so” (Van Fraassen 2008: 23).  
 
But the recognition of the fundamental role of use in scientific representation poses 
problems for constructive empiricism – which I flagged over a decade ago. Unfortunately 
Van Fraassen seems to have misunderstood what I wrote then (although he clearly 
recognises the tension). He writes: “In a comment on similar “intentional” views of what 
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constitutes representation, Mauricio Suarez suggests that it will hamstring the idea that 
theories represent” (Van Fraassen 2008: 26). And he then quotes the following sentence: 
“on the intentional conception of representation a theory cannot ‘represent’ a 
phenomenon that hasn’t yet been observed” (Suarez 1999: 81). But the extract has been 
taken out of context. Far from criticizing ‘intended use”, my paper set out explicitly to 
critique what I took to be the received understanding of Van Fraassen’s conception of 
representation as isomorphism – and I argued against it precisely by showing it to ignore 
intended use!  
 
My own view is of course that representation is essentially linked to representational use, 
and I have always accepted the hauptsatz above. (Even though the hauptsatz is really 
very thin and provides little in the way of understanding the relevant practices). This is 
precisely the sense in which theories do not always represent – their representational uses 
are not built in. The claim Van Fraassen ascribes to me in no way follows from this. An 
‘intended use’ conception does not hamstring the idea that theories represent at all. It 
rather shows that theories sometimes represent, and sometimes don’t, and whether they 
do or not depends on nothing other than use. In particular it does not depend on 
isomorphism. (In criticizing isomorphism, partial isomorphism, etc., I took myself to be 
working in the tradition of Goodman. It is a cruel irony of life that Van Fraassen (2008: 
349, n. 1) appears to ascribe the application of Goodman’s exemplification to the 
assessment of the accuracy of scientific representation to - of all people - Steven French!)  
  
The misunderstanding might have its source in a conflation of ‘intentionality’ and 
‘intended use’ conceptions of representation. From the start I set out to defend an 
intended use conception: Velazquez’s portrait of Innocent X and Picasso’s Guernica are 
explicitly advanced to illustrate that use is the key to establish representational contents 
or targets in general. As a reaction to a draft of my paper Bas sent me a draft of the paper 
that eventually appeared as his (Van Fraassen 2000), which continues his (Van Fraassen 
1994) development of an intentional conception. Since this view is also at least prima 
facie incompatible with the reduction to isomorphism, the difference between ‘intended 
use’ and ‘intentional’ in general did not matter to my purpose then – which was to 
criticise and reject the reduction to isomorphism. So in the rejoinder I wrote in response 
‘intended use’ and ‘intentional’ were run together. Later on I did make clear that the 
differences do matter for the appropriate conception of representation (Suárez 2003). 
Chapter 2 of Scientific Representation is to my knowledge Van Fraassen’s first attempt to 
disentangle these two different views. Despite of some residual hesitations on pp. 26-29, 
he also seems to be ultimately inclined towards an intended use conception.  
 
I realise this is indulging in some self-referential score-keeping, so let us quickly take 
stock before we move on. I once made the following claim: “there is tension between an 
intentional notion of representation and Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism” 
(Suárez 1999: 81). With the appropriate caveat to read ‘intentional’ as ‘intended use’, I 
continue to endorse it. It actually nicely summarises the main reasons that have moved 




2. The arguments for ‘structural empiricism’ 
 
The most original material in Scientific Representation is contained in part II, which 
reveals great attention to the practices of measurement and instrumentation. Many years 
ago the Stanford school urged philosophers to turn towards an experimental philosophy 
of science. Some of us embraced the call, while others resisted. The résistance often 
presented Van Fraassen as a leading theory-monger, and employed him as a banner for 
the entire movement. This no longer seems credible: Scientific Representation is a 
turning point for admirably taking stock of the literature on instrumentation and 
experimentation of the last two decades. The autonomy of the experimental sciences is 
fundamentally taken to heart, which is a wonderful development for at least two reasons. 
First, it is refreshing to find a senior and distinguished figure in the field taking honest 
stock of a distinct and even contrary tradition. Second, constructive empiricism suffered 
from lack of detail in the experimental side of the theory-experiment dichotomy that it 
promoted; and this was undermining it in the contemporary context of new 
experimentalism.  
 
The most outstanding outcome of this encounter with experimentalism is a new 
distinction between the observable phenomena and the appearances, which comes to the 
fore in Part IV of the book. The introduction of a 3-layer model (theory-phenomena-
appearances) is motivated by both the autonomy of experiment and the use-based 
conception of representation. The observable phenomena underlies (and presumably 
causes) the appearances (Van Fraassen of course refrains from using any causal 
language). These are the outcomes of measurement procedures, recorded in various data-
models, and routinely employed to represent the phenomena. But the representation at 
this level can not be isomorphism – since while the data models are mathematical 
structures, the phenomena are real entities and processes in the physical world. Rather the 
appearances represent the phenomena in the prescribed use-based sense of representation 
– in the given context and for the purposes required. No proofs of isomorphism or 
similarity are needed: it just makes no sense for users of the data model to deny that the 
model represents the phenomenon – since the claim is built into their very use (Van 
Fraassen 2008: 250-261). The theory is then empirically adequate if it embeds the 
appearances – and this no longer carries the implication that a substructure of the theory 
must be shown to be isomorphic to the phenomena. ‘Saving the phenomena’ has turned 
into ‘embedding the appearances that represent the phenomena’. The adoption of the 3-
layer model – and consequent rejection of the theory-phenomena dichotomy – turns 
constructive empiricism into structural empiricism. 
 
The rest of the book is a defence of structural empiricism against i) objections to 
structuralism in general (part III), and ii) the requirement that the phenomena ought to 
productively explain the appearances (part IV). While I have some sympathy with the 
rebuttal of ii), the arguments in part III don’t strike me as successful. Van Fraassen points 
out similarities between Newman’s argument against Russell’s structuralism, and 
Putnam’s model theoretic argument against metaphysical realism. Roughly, both 
Newman and Putnam show that the statement of isomorphism between theory and world 
picks out nothing but the cardinality of the domains. Van Fraassen’s resolution to the 
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problem resembles Goodman’s solution of the ‘new riddle’ of induction in that it appeals 
to entrenched facts of our linguistic practice – in particular the inevitable use of 
indexicals within a familiar language in setting up the right coordination or 
correspondences between theory and world. Goodman’s ‘entrenchment’ move has been 
considered ‘ad hoc’ or circular as a justification of induction. Similarly critics of 
structuralism might be inclined to point out that Van Fraassen’s move is ad hoc or 
circular as a justification of structuralism. It can not ground structuralism as the correct 
account of our theoretical knowledge of the world – whether in its realist or empiricist 
variety.  
 
One way to defend Goodman’s argument is to point to the impossibility of any ultimate 
justification of induction. Instead ‘entrenchment’ must be understood as vindication of 
the use of induction in practice. But this is of course a surreptitious rejection of pure 
induction – for it assumes that all inductive reasoning presupposes some basic non-
inductive practical knowledge of the rules that inform inquiry. Similarly Van Fraassen’s 
‘solution’ of Newman’s objection and Putnam’s argument may be seen to surreptitiously 
abandon structuralism in either the empiricist or realist varieties. Once again the key lies 
instead in the features of the underlying practice of representation users. But such 
features, however indispensable in the production and acquisition of knowledge, are not 
structural but social. 
 
 
3. Towards Pragmatism 
 
There is increasing consensus in the literature that representation may not be naturalised, 
reduced or defined, as either a property of the objects that stand in the representational 
relation, or a property of the intentionality of the agents that employ it. Instead 
representation is grounded upon the representational uses of particular communities, and 
no further reduction seems available or required.  
 
This is all very welcome (it is music to the ears of an inferentialist like me!), but it might 
at first seem to contradict the semantic conception of scientific theories. Van Fraassen 
argues successfully that this is not the case (2008, Appendix to chapter 1: 309-11), and 
his argument can be strengthened further. The semantic conception is a view about the 
objects that are scientific theories. By itself it says nothing about the nature of 
representation, which is instead best thought of as an activity. The object – the theory - is 
at best the product of the activity – representation. But to characterize the activity by 
means of its product would commit a category mistake, and fallacies would ensue. More 
precisely, it would entail the fallacy that every feature of an activity must have a correlate 
in its product, or vice-versa. And this is fallacious for any activity we know, whether or 
not productive in the required sense. Some activities simply lack the products to carry out 
the process-product correlation (e.g. riding a bicycle, playing tennis).  And those that are 
productive in the required sense invariably violate the process-product correlation 
requirement (e.g. pottery, painting, cooking). The view that the semantic conception of 
theories entails a particular view of representation commits the same category mistake. 
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Notice that the argument above depends on accepting a broadly intended use conception 
that grounds representation in the social world. On this view representation is an activity 
carried out by a community engaged in a collective social practice – and the underlying 
norms of the practice determine representational sources and targets. An intentionality 
conception by contrast would take it that sources and targets are determined by some 
intentional state of some particular agent or agents, regardless of community, practice, 
and indeed any intended or unintended uses. On such view, which has its origins in the 
writings of Brentano and infuses the phenomenological tradition, representation is 
necessarily the property of individuals: representation is ‘in the head’. The turn from 
‘intentional’ to ‘intended use’ views is thus the first step towards a thoroughly pragmatist 
and social conception of scientific representation and knowledge that leaves conventional 
empiricism, structuralism and realism all behind. Scientific Representation is useful book 
that reorients the debate in the right direction, but much work still remains to be done. 
 
MAURICIO SUAREZ 
Dept. of Logic and Philosophy of Science, 
Complutense University of Madrid, 
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